Abstract: This article examines Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī's work entitled al-Hayūlā wa al-Sūrah, whose subject pertains to a critique of the opinion, held by peripatetic philosophers such as al-Fārābī, Ibn Sīnā, that the "body" is composed of matter and form. In this article, extant copies of the work are introduced; its name, date of writing, and chronology in relation to the author's other works are established, the authorship of al-Rāzī is demonstrated, and finally the text is edited. As the next step, the issues addressed by the text are identified. In this context, al-Rāzī's critiques on the definition and the reality of the body, and on the body as being composed of matter and form are discussed. In particular, those works of al-Rāzī's that deal with these issues -namely, al-Mabāhith, al-Mulakhkhas, Jawābāt 'an Shukūk al-Mas'ūdī, Sharh al-Ishārāt, al-Hayūlā wa al-Sūrah, Lubāb al-Ishārāt, Sharh 'Uyūn al-Hikma, and al-Matālib -are discussed from a chronological perspective, their contents regarding the issues at hand are compared, the development of proofs is shown, and tables demonstrating the change are presented. In the section where the content is discussed, although the importance of the subject with regard to philosophical thought and theological principles is touched upon, al-Rāzī's thoughts on atomism have been particularly avoided. As we continued through the process of identifying al-Rāzī's ideas, we found that throughout his scholarly career, he criticized the notion of the body being composed of matter and form. We ascertained that instead of this definition, he saw the body as having an entity with a single reality and essence, holding that spatiality, volume, extension and the ability to be physically pointed at are all accidents that inhere in this essence and reality. We elaborated on al-Rāzī's idea that the body can be defined by the enumeration of its accidental attributes in question.
F or a complete description of the nature, content, and orientation of Islamic thought, an important step is to publish texts generated within this tradition. Most works of Fakhr al-Dīn al- Rāzī (d. 606 / 1210 ) -a key figure during the late period of Islamic thought who played a major role in the re-determination of the content, method, and purpose of theology and philosophy -have been published. Yet, the full identification of the entire corpus of his works, their contents, and in what chronological order they were written coupled with the fact that a portion of his works remains unpublished are two impending tasks that remain to be done. On the way to helping fully discover the complete works of al-Rāzī, this study aims to introduce, publish, and discuss the content of one of his works on the concept of prime matter (hayūlā), previously unknown in both classical and modern sources.
I. Information on the Copy and the Method of Edition
There is a compilation in the Library of the National Advisory Council of Iran under number 3933 which includes two very important treatises belong to Fakhruddīn al-Rāzī. The first treatise of this compilation, toward whose future publication we are currently working, is al-Rāzī's work on the atom (al-jawhar al-fard), whose name is cited in the catalog as ithbātu juz'in la yatajazza' and on the inside cover as ithbātu juz'illadhi la yatajazza'. And the second treatise, the subject matter of this article, is on the rejection of prime matter (hayūlā). The name al-Hayūlā wa al- §ūrah: Tahqīqu haqīqat al-jism wa haddihī, as it appears in the library catalog, is probably the name of this second treatise. The note regarding the content on the inside cover is as follows: . The secondary sources, whose individual names we did not deem necessary to provide here and which are based on the works of these primary figures written in the 13 th and 14 th centuries, do not include the name of this treatise, either. Therefore, it only appears in al-Tūsī's Fihristu Mu~annafāti Mawlānā Fakhruddīn al-Rāzī as Risālatun fī al-Hayūlā. 8 The most important testimony found in classical sources regarding its name and its belonging to al-Rāzī is his own testimony in the work entitled al-Khalq wa 'lba'th. 9 According to this work, those who maintain that the body is pre-eternal (qadīm) base their opinion on the notion that contingency (imkān) is both existential (wujūdī) and dependent on matter (hayūlā), and also that matter cannot exist independent of a bodily form. Based on his belief that contingency is not existential, that matter is not pre-eternal, and that it is not impossible for matter to exist without a bodily form, al-Rāzī rejects the fifth proof of those who acknowledge other pre-eternal beings besides God and refers as follows to the subject matter / title of the treatise that we are publishing:
‫ولكن‬ ‫سلمناه‬ ‫حمال,‬ ‫تستدعي‬ ‫حىت‬ ‫ثبوتيا‬ ‫وصفا‬ ‫ليس‬ ‫اإلمكان‬ ‫أن‬ ‫سبق‬ ‫فيما‬ ‫بينا‬ ‫قد‬ ‫اخلامس:‬ ‫عن‬ ‫واجلواب‬ ‫رسالة‬ ‫يف‬ ‫مذكور‬ ‫الكالم‬ ‫هذا‬ ‫تقرير‬ ‫ومتام‬ ‫اجلسمية,‬ ‫عن‬ ‫خلوه‬ ‫ميتنع‬ ‫باهليوىل‬ ‫تسمونه‬ ‫الذي‬ ‫املحل‬ ‫بأن‬ ‫قلتم‬ ‫مل‬ ‫هناك.‬ ‫فليطلب‬ ‫اهليوىل,‬ ‫نفي‬ ‫بيان‬ ‫يف‬ ‫صنفناها‬ ‫مفردة‬
The answer to the fifth proof: We have earlier explained that contingency is not a positive [thubūtī] attribute that belongs to existence so that it would require a substrate. We have recognized this, but why did you claim that it is impossible for what you name "matter" to exist without there being a bodily form? A full explanation of this was made in a sepa-
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Ibn al-Qıftī, Tārīh al-hukamā ', 292-293. 3 Ibn al-Sha 'ār, VI, [108] [109] [110] [111] Ibn Abī Usaybi'a, ' 470. 5 Ibn Khallikān, IV, 249. 6 Kutubī, IV, 12b. 7 §afadī, IV, [254] [255] [256] 375a , also see Bayezit Library Veliyüddin Efendi, n. 2189, 250a; Topkapı Sarayı Library, III. Ahmed, n. 1461, 137b. 9 al 96a. rate treatise that we authored about the explanation of the denial of matter. So find the explanation therein.
10
If we presume that the phrase fī bayāni nafy al-hayūlā is the name of the treatise, we have three alternative names for the treatise including al-Tūsī's list and the library catalog: (i) Risālatun fī bayāni nafy al-hayūlā, (ii) Risālatun fī al-hayūlā, (iii) alHayūlā wa al- §ūrah: Tahqīqu haqīqati'l-jism wa haddihī. It may be said that the phrases used in the text by al-Rāzī include the name of the treatise, but at the same time they may be references to its subject matter, because al-Rāzī is known to refer to his works by their names, as well as by their subjects. 11 The phrase Risālatun fī al-hayūlā that occurs in the list of al-Tūsī, however, is more of a reference to a treatise on matter, whose name is not fully specified. In addition, the name in the library catalog does not sound like a name that al-Rāzī would have given this treatise, as a scholar who rejects the idea of the body being composed of matter and form. Moreover, the content of the treatise is set on negating matter while not containing the details of the subject of bodily form. As a result, it is possible to say that the treatise does not have a name determined by al-Rāzī, and that it will be difficult to make a decision in this matter until some evidence emerges in support of one of the three names.
We may think that the statements in al-Khalq wa al-ba'th are a reference to the sixth volume of al-Matālib al-'āliyya named fī al-hayūlā. However, it turns out that these phrases are not about al-Matālib's volume entitled fī al-hayūlā given that alKhalq wa al-ba'th was written sometime between 596-597 A.H. (1200-1201 A.D.) 
12
, and that al-Matālib's volume on hayūlā was finished on 12 Jumada al-Thāni 605 (Dec. 22, 1208) 13 . The phrase, "an independent treatise," within the text also shows that this treatise cannot be part of such an encyclopedic work as al-Matālib.
b. Al-Tūsī's list and the personal references made by al-Rāzī himself constitute sufficient evidence that the treatise actually belongs to al-Rāzī. However, it would be more appropriate to draw attention to further evidence on this issue. First, we can establish a relation of similarity. Different forms of a large part of the criticisms and proofs in this treatise can be found in al-Rāzī's other works. Therefore, there are numerous examples of al-Rāzī directing his readership to his other works in cases when subjects and proofs are similar. We delay providing the related examples until the fourth section, where we will make comparative content analyses. Second, we can establish a relation of sameness and repetition. For example, proofs in the 10 al 96a. 11 For similar references made by al- 339b; 456; II, 127. 12 Altaş, [127] [128] VI, 215. second chapter of this treatise demonstrating that the body is not composed of matter and form are provided by al-Rāzī in his work entitled Sharh 'Uyūn al-Hikma.
14 It is possible to comparatively demonstrate in seven paragraphs -with the first paragraph being provided verbatim, the others in shortened form -that certain texts in both books are either the same to the letter, very similar, or that the texts in Sharh 'Uyūn al-Hikma are summaries made from this treatise. and the list of a small number of works provided by Griffel based on this 31 may also be considered within the context of chronology. The additional section in Kaplan's doctoral dissertation in which he introduces al-Rāzī's works contains significant data for the determination of writing dates. 32 Since the existence of the treatise on hayūlā currently in question was unknown during all of these efforts, there are naturally no notes on its chronology, either. However, a number of findings regarding the chronology of this treatise are provided in our work entitled "Chronology of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī's Works," which establishes the writing dates of more than 60 works written by al-Rāzī.
33
The aforementioned autobiographical information in the treatise on hayūlā, which informs about al-Rāzī's age, provides an idea about the writing date of the treatise. Given that al-Rāzī was born on 25 Ramadan 544 (Jan. 25, 1150) 34 and that he says in the text, "until the present time when I have reached the fifty-second year of my life," it may be calculated that the treatise was written in the year 596/1200. Upon an invitation from the Sultan of Ghūr, Ghiyāthaddīn Muhammad (reign: 558-599/1163-1203), al-Rāzī left Bāmiyān in 595 (1199) 37 Al-Rāzī lectured a great many students 38 in the madrasa 39 that Sultan Ghiyāthaddīn had built for him in Herat near the Grand Mosque. The treatise on hayūlā was written during the years that al-Rāzī was protected and supported by the Ghurians, during which time he entered his most prolific time as a writer. During nearly a decade of living under the auspices of the Ghurians, al-Rāzī wrote the following works, sorted chronologically here: Asrār al-Tanzīl wa anwār al-ta 'wīl, It is important that the chronology of al-Hayūlā wa al- §ūrah be established with respect to other works that examine the same topic. Al-Rāzī dealt with this issue for the first time in his al-Mabāhith, written in 574-575 (1178-1179) . In this work, his examination centers on al-Mas'ūdī's criticisms. In his work entitled Sharh al-Ishārāt, authored in 576 (1180), he examines the issue as a commentary on and a rejection of Ibn Sīnā's explanations in al-Ishārāt. 44 Al-Hayūlā wa al- §ūrah, written in 596/1200, about 20 years after Sharh alIshārāt, is most likely the first work to be dedicated to this topic in the history of Islamic philosophy and theology. Exclusively devoted to the reality of the body and the critique of the idea that the body is composed of matter and form, this treatise has an important place among the works of al-Rāzī.
In addition to this treatise, another work written as a summary of Ibn Sīnā's opinions is Lubāb al-Ishārāt, written in 597 (1201) 45 . As for Sharh 'Uyūn al-Hikma, written in the last five years of al-Rāzī's life, probably sometime around 605-606 (1209), it contains the second part of al-Hayūlā wa al- §ūrah to the letter. 46 The last work in which this topic is discussed is a separate volume of al-Matālib named Fī al-Hayūlā. Recorded to have been completed on 12 Jumada al-Thāni 605 (Dec. 22, 1208)
47
, al-Rāzī mostly lists the proofs for and against atomism in this volume, employing more geometrical proofs than in any other work that he had previously written while also discussing a number of issues regarding prime matter.
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Al-Rāzī examined, albeit partially, the issue of matter and form in his works with a predominantly theological perspective as well. For example, the issue is briefly discussed within the context of atomism in Nihāyāt al-'Uqūl written between 575-576 (1179-1180) 49 , in al-Muha~~al written between 585-590 (1189-1194) 50 , in Ithbāt juz'in lā yatajazza' written partially in Transoxania between 580-584 (1184-1188) and finished in Marw between 589-591 (1193-1195) 51 , and in al-Arba'īn written in the year 595 (1199). 52 
III. Content of the Treatise
Al-Hayūlā wa al- §ūrah was penned to explain "whether the body is composed of matter and form" and is organized into an introduction and four chapters.
Introduction: Consisting of hamd (praise to God), ~alāwāt (benedictions upon the Prophet Muhammad) and a note that the treatise was written extemporaneously on request.
Chapter One: The determination of the focal point of the debate between theologians and philosophers about the reality of the body.
Chapter Two: Three proofs that the body is composed neither of matter nor of form. This chapter also includes an intermediate section on the definition of the body.
Chapter Three: An explanation of the proofs cited by those who are of the opinion that the body is composed of matter and form, and four stations in the criticism of these proofs.
Chapter Four: Conclusion; distinction between the substance of the body and its attributes, and al-Rāzī's opinion.
Since the content of the treatise focuses on what the body is, the details of matter and form are not dealt with in this treatise. For example, among the subjects not examined in this treatise are the existence of matter for all bodies, and that matter cannot exist without form and vice versa, and how matter is related to form, and the subjects of generic form and natural form.
IV. The Definition of the Body, the Verification of its Reality, and the Critique of the Body being Composed of Matter and Form
Based on the content of al-Hayūlā wa al- §ūrah, there are five issues to be discussed; namely, (1) the reality of the body, (2) its philosophical implications and the problems it engenders from a theological perspective, (3) the definition of the body, (4) al-Rāzī's proofs that the body is not composed of matter and form, and (5) the presentation of Ibn Sīnā's proofs, who maintains that the body is composed of matter and form, and al-Rāzī's critique of this position.
1. Al-Rāzī, using very similar words, classifies the opinions about the reality of the body in many of his works in the following manner: 53 53 al II, 15; 343b; 113b; 6; 116; II, [3] [4] VI, [19] [20] . . According to the detail that he gives, the view that is accepted by Democritus, Abu Bakr al- Rāzī (d. 313/925) , and Abu al-Barakāt al-Baghdādī, namely (f), solid particles in different sizes that can be divided into three dimensions in the imagination (wahm), but who do not accept actual disjunction in the external world, must be added to this table. 59 We may note here that al-Samarqandī (d. 702 / 1303) later added to al-Rāzī's table (e) ancient philosophers who considered the actually divisible parts of the object not as atoms, but as lines.
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According to the opinion of the theologians subscribing to (a) above, which alRāzī also generally defended, the body composed of atoms is made up of width, height, and depth, and these are actual.
61 But according to (d), defended by al-Fārābī (d. 339/950) and Ibn Sīnā, there is no need to prove the existence of a corporeal form because the existence of an extended body that encompasses physical space is a fact which can be perceived by the senses. However a corporeal form, which consists of extension and occupation of space, is not a self-subsisting entity in and of itself and therefore it must inhere in a substrate. The substrate, which this corporeal form inheres in, is matter. Thus, the body is a substance composed of both a bodily form and matter. 62 The understanding that the body is composed of matter and 54 al-Rāzī, Ithbātu juz'in lā yatajazza', 1 55 There is a difference between the opinion al-Rāzī ascribes to Nazzām and the one ascribed to him by Abu al-Husayn al-Hayyāt. al-Hayyāt, al-Inti~ār, 66-81. 56 al-Rāzī, Ithbātu juz'in lā yatajazza', 1 57 According to the testimony of al-Rāzī, al-Shahristanī explains this opinion of his in his work entitled al-Manāhij wa al-Bayyināt. al VI, 20. 58 Ibn Sīnā, İşaretler ve Tenbihler, [80] [81] [82] Ibn Sīnā, [139] [140] [141] [254] [255] VI, 9; II, 9, III, [16] [17] VI, 200; Ibn Sīnā, Metafizik II, [57] [58] [59] [60] form was always criticized by theologians, among whom al-Rāzī, because this understanding incorporated certain aspects that went against the pre-eternity of God (azaliyyah) and implicitly denied religious principles, such as the afterlife. Many theologians, such as al-Māturīdī (d. 333 / 944), al-Ghazzālī (d. 555 / 1111), and alShahristānī (d. 548 / 1153), stated that accepting the existence of a matter (hayūlā) that constituted the bases of beings would make it difficult to prove the existence and attributes of God, noting also that it would undermine the idea of creation from nothing (ex nihilo). 63 The acceptance of matter was at the same time understood as something that would impose a limit on God's will and might, in the context of natural causality in the universe. As a matter of fact, al-Ghazzālī rejected the type of essential determinism that stems from the nature of objects, and instead drew attention to relationality based on [divine] customs [or divine customary patterns], which in turn is based on God's will and might. 64 Authors, such as al-Nasafī (d. 508 / 1115) and al-Shahristānī, compared the idea of matter to the Mu'tazilite view of the nonexistent, and drew attention to the problems inherent in these two conceptions in terms of creation and pre-eternity.
65 Al-Taftazānī (d. 792 / 1390) , an author from amongst the post-classical scholars, indicates the conclusions of a debate on the reality of the body, in the following way:
If asked whether there is any fruit of the controversy [between theologians and philosophers about the reality of the body], we say thus: Yes, in proving the existence of the atom lies a path of salvation from most of the philosophers' obscurities, such as the affirmation of matter and form., which leads to the pre-eternity of the cosmos and the negation of the bodily resurrection. [Also in proving the existence of the atom] lies salvation from most geometrical principles, on which the continuity of the movement of the heavens, and the impossibility of their separation and unification relies.
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Al-Rāzī examined the theological implications of the understanding of the body -stated sententiously by al-Taftazānī -particularly in his Nihāyat al-'Uqūl and al-Matālib. In al-Rāzī's description; according to theologians, all of existence was created with a temporal creation preceded by nonexistence. The pre-eternal Being creates substances, and by combining these substances, He creates bodies. Philosophers, however, advocate the idea that God, who is essentially pre-eternal, created existence by giving form to the pre-eternal matter that was in a state of potentiali- 79; 95, [125] [126] [127] [128] [215] [216] 119; [163] [164] [165] [166] [167] [168] [239] [240] [241] 103; 25. ty. 67 On the other hand, the return of the bodies to the spirits and the possibility of a physical resurrection are based on the negation of the idea of matter and on the affirmation of the atom.
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Al-Rāzī, draws attention to the philosophical implications of the form-matter theory in his Sharh 'Uyūn al-Hikma. There, al-Rāzī argues that Ibn Sīnā's opinion that "the natural body is composed of matter and form" can constitute a basis for only four subjects: Two of these relate to physics, whereas the other two are connected with metaphysics. The first subject that relates to physics is that the conception of the body as being composed of matter and form proves the expansion and condensation in bodies, and this in turn provides an opportunity for the negation of the void. The other subject pertaining to physics is the bodies of heavenly spheres not being able to dispersion or cohesion. The metaphysical issues that depend on this principle are the proof that (1) the body in terms of its essense is contingent and (2) that the Necessary Being is not a body. 69 However, the treatise of al-Hayūlā wa al- §ūrah contains no reference about either the theological or the philosophical implications of the understanding of the body as composed of matter and form.
2.
The definition of the body is one of the major issues that this treatise discusses. For Ibn Sīnā, the body is a thing for which it is possible to assume three dimensions that intersect at right angles. According to this definition, the dimensions are not actual, but potential. The assumption or imagination of points, lines, and surfaces in a body rather than their existence therein suffices. The reason is, the dimensions that intersect at right angles may not be actually present in shapes, such as a sphere, a cylinder, or a cone. Even if we accept their actual existence in a cube, the source of the corporeality of a body in the shape of a cube is not the actual dimensions.
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Al-Rāzī consistently maintains his critique of Ibn Sīnā's definition of the body from his earlier works up until his latest ones. Al-Rāzī criticizes this definition, which in al-Mabāhith he calls as description (al-rasm), from various angles: (a) Through the mediation of a corporeal form we may assume three dimensions in matter. In this case, this definition of the body also incorporates matter. (b) It is possible to assume three dimensions in the imagination as well. Therefore, imaginary dimensions can be named "geometrical bodies." However, the imagination is not a body. (c) Possibility and ability which are employed in the definition of the 67 al VI, [199] [200] II, [24] [25] [26] Metafizik I, [57] [58] [59] [60] VI, 9; 113b. body are not existential (wujūdī) things. Things that belong to nonexistence, on the other hand, can be employed only in the definition of simple things, because simple things are defined through their concomitants. However, in the eyes of those who support this definition, the body is composed of genus and differentia in terms of its essence, and of matter and form in terms of existence.
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The proof that Ibn Sīnā's definition is a description (al-rasm) is constructed on the question in al-Mulakhkhas about what it is that accepts the inherence of dimensions. That is, (d) that which accepts the inherence of dimensions cannot be a form because form is something with which the object becomes actual. In this case, form cannot be receptive (qābil) and active (fi'l) at the same time. And it is not possible for matter, either, to accept the dimensions before form.
72
Al-Rāzī mentions another criticism in Sharh al-Ishārāt. (e) The attribution of receptivity to a thing follows its essence. There has to be a body first so that receptivity can be attributed to it. In this case, if being capable of accepting the three dimensions were a substantive component of the body, this capability would have to precede itself by two stations. In this case, the definition that "the body is something which is assumed to be capable of having three dimensions" is incorrect.
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Al-Rāzī cites in al-Matālib three proofs about why this definition cannot be a definition, and five proofs about why it cannot be a description, either. According to al-Rāzī, the reason this definition cannot be a definition is the following (in addition to the above-mentioned articles of (c) and (e) ) : (f) The body's capability of accepting three dimensions is a relation (al-izāfa) and an attribute (as-~ifa). The essence of the body, however, is a substance which is self-subsisting. It is not possible for a relative attribute to be the substantive component of a thing to which it is attributed. The proofs in this work which demonstrate that this definition is not a description are based on the facts that dimensions intersecting at right angles can appear after becoming a body, and that human nature (fitrah) always recognizes volume and the occupation of space more clearly than attributes, such as having corners, angles, and capability.
74 Apart from these criticisms, which were repeated in later theological literature, al-Rāzī, in this treatise in particular, criticizes the definition of the body based on whether a body's genus is substance (jawhar).
71 al II, VI, [15] [16] [17] [18] Al-Rāzī's first criticism in this treatise regarding the definition of the body is directed toward why Ibn Sīnā, who holds that the body is composed of matter and form, did not mention the substance of matter in his definition of the body, while his second criticism pertains to the understanding claiming that the body is a sub-category under substance (jawhar), but which doesn't have any other parallel divider (qasīm). In al-Mabāhith, al-Rāzī maintains that substance is not a substantive component of those categories under it, that is, it cannot be predicated of them as a genus. According to him, the substance can be predicated of those under it as the way non-substantive concomitants are predicated.
75 Al-Rāzī cites the proofs of this in al-Mabāhith and al-Mulakhkha~: According to first proof (a), if substance is a genus, the species under it must be able to be differentiated from one another through various differentia. According to the assumption that these differentia are accidents, if the accident subsisting through substances is also the substantive component of the substance that it depends on for its own existence to be sustained, an infinite regression (tasalsul) will result. Therefore, differentia must be considered as substances. Consequently when substance is predicated of these differentia -which are substances themselves-as a genus, genus (which is substance) and differentia (which in this assumption is also substance) must be equal. In this case, these differentia are substances; however, the name 'substance' is predicated of them as concomitants which in turn means that substance is not a genus, but simply one of the body's comcomitants. According to second proof (b) when the body is taken to be a substance, if being a substance is interpreted as not needing a subject or that the essence is the cause of not needing, these cannot be genus since both of these are negative meanings. If being a substance is interpreted as an essence for which cause is an accident, in this case it is not possible for substance to be taken as a genus since there cannot be a common attribute between the species of the genus. According to final proof (c); if the essence, which is considered a substance, is simple, it cannot be a species of any genus. This is due to the principle that since a simple thing cannot have differentia, it will be in need of differentia in order to be distinguished from the other species under the same genus, thereby rendering it into a compound. Hence any simple thing falls under substance, and not under genus, meaning that substance is not a genus. Since the possibilities listed in (a) will be valid for the assumption that the essence, which is considered a substance under this theory, is a compound, it ensues that substance is not predicated as genus to the thing which fall under it. Acting on this background, al-Rāzī questions whether the genus of substance has any other species than body. According to al-Rāzī, matter, form, and separate intellects, which are considred as species of the genus of substance, are simple, meaning that they do not have differentia. Since that which does not have differentia, as a species, cannot be differentiated from other species, they cannot be parallel or common dividers (qasīm) of the body. Furthermore, in the event that the body is considered a single species under the genus of substance, the following question becomes relevant: "From which species does the body's differentia separate it?" These criticisms led al-Rāzī to the following result: Just like accident is not the genus of the nine accidents under it, so is substance not the genus of the substances under it. Because substance cannot be predicated of those under it as their genus, it is not necessary for the body to be composed of genus and differentia. And since there is nothing that demonstrates that the body is composed of matter and form, the body is a substance which is not composed of matter and form. And such a simple substance can only be defined through its concomitants and its effects. 3. al-Rāzī's changing opinion toward atomism is a fact. However, it can be clearly stated that he never accepted the theory of matter and form and that he never changed his attitude regarding this theory. The three main proofs that he employed in the critique of this theory, however, underwent distinct developments. The most general presupposition, on which al-Rāzī bases his critique of matter and form, is that the matter and form must have precede the composite body in existence and that they come together due to a principle.
Al-Rāzī's first evidence in rejecting the conception of the composite body is to question what it is that fundamentally gives volume and extension to the body. As a matter of fact, al-Rāzī's first proof based on the analysis of matter and form is a divided syllogism, using such variables as occupying space, having extension, and possessing volume, which seeks to eliminate the different possibilities regarding what it is that produces these things . Chronologically speaking, this proof was first discussed in al-Mabāhith and Sharh al-Ishārāt, taking its most complete form in the treatise being published now. It was later partially repeated in Sharh 'Uyūn al-Hikma and al-Matālib, two works al-Rāzī penned later in his life. Its development is shown in Table 1, Table 2, and Table 3 . The second proof that al-Rāzī uses to reject the notion that a body is a composite, revolves around a re-assessment of Ibn Sīnā's proof that matter cannot exist independent of a bodily form. According to Ibn Sīnā's proof, if matter is considered independent of a bodily form, the quantitative difference between the matter of the half and that of the whole cannot be explained. The explanation of this difference becomes possible only through a bodily form that engenders such quantitative differences as volume and size.
78 Al-Rāzī criticizes this evidence in three ways. Two of them, which are presented in al-Hayūlā wa al- §ūrah, are based on a comparison between the matter of the half and that of the whole. According to this, if it is only matter being taken into consideration, a quantitative difference and differentiation is inevitable between the matter of the half and that of the whole (see Table 4 ), meaning that matter has had bodily qualities from the start. In this case, it is not necessary to state that the body is composed of matter and form. The third criticism of Ibn Sīnā's proof is repeated in al-Mabāhith and al-Mulakhkha~ to the letter, using the exact same phrases. According to this criticism, matter cannot be the substrate of forms that engender quantitative magnitudes if, as in Ibn Sīnā's thought, it is not the source of quantitative magnitudes, such as volume because there is no difference between being a source of differences in quantitative magnitudes and being a substrate wherein quantitative magnitudes inhere in the sense that Ibn Sīnā perceives it. Hence, the penetration of a bodily form into matter is just as problematic as matter being the source of bodily magnitudes. 79 Table 4 : The structure of the second proof on the rejection of hayūlā as in al-Hayūlā wa al- §ūrah
The third proof of al-Rāzī found itself a place in its complete form for the first time in al-Mabāhith as part of his critique of Ibn Sīnā's proof about matter, 80 and he makes a reference to the main idea of the proof in al-Mulakhkhas 81 and in Jawābāt . This proof is repeated in Sharh al-Ishārāt in a way similar to its form as presented in al-Mabāhith, but with an increased number of reasons for the premises. 83 Repeated later in al-Hayūlā wa al- §ūrah and Sharh 'Uyūn al-Hikma in a systematic way, the proof is given in al-Matālib as a summary with its different aspects. As al-Rāzī points out in al-Matālib, when he, regarding his criticism, was not 79 al I, [245] [246] [247] II, [48] [49] [24] [25] met with an adequate response by the exponents of the theory of matter, he took it upon himself to first articulate and then answer their potential criticisms that could later be directed at his proof.
84
Al-Rāzī's third evidence focuses on the state of the matter of a composite body at the moment of division. According to this, the impossibility for a body to be composed of matter and form is displayed here by demonstrating the absurdity of matter being single or multiple, and if it's multiple, the absurdity of the emergence of multiplicity before or after division, given that matter and form are ontologically distinct from each other and the thing accepting division is matter. A simpler form of the evidence shown in Table 5 is -according to a narration by Akkirmānī (d. 1174 / 1760)-among the proofs put forward in the Illuminationist (ishrāqī) tradition against the body being made up of matter and form.
85 Table 5 : The structure of the third proof on the rejection of hayūlā in al- Mabāhith, II, [48] [49] [24] [25] II, 26. 84 al VI, 205 vd. 85 Akkirmānī, 14. 4. The fourth issue to be handled in regards to the treatise is al-Rāzī's discussion of Ibn Sīnā's argument that matter cannot exist independent of form. This proof of Ibn Sīnā is based on a single body's continuity and divisibility. 86 In al-Rāzī's statement, we find that Ibn Sīnā's proof and its ensuing commentary stirred up heated debates in al-Rāzī's lifetime. Al-Rāzī says that this evidence can be understood in one of three ways.
Of these, the first way, according to which the body incorporates the possibility of being generated and corrupted and thus is in need of matter, is partially referred to in Sharh al-Ishārāt 87 , fully explained in al-Hayūlā and repeated in Sharh 'Uyūn al-Hikma. 88 Al-Rāzī explains that according to this understanding, the division of a simple body means annihilating the first body and generating two new bodies. , that with which the body is actually continuous (i.e. form) must be different from that with which it is potentially divisible (i.e. matter). Al-Rāzī criticizes this form by investigating whether the hayūlā has an ontological reality prior to the compound body.
As for the third form of the proof narrated in al-Mabāhith

95
, al-Hayūlā, Sharh 'Uyūn al-hikma 96 , and al-Matālib
97
, it posits that that which necessitates the continuity of the body (i.e. form) must be different from that which allows for its divisibility (matter). According to al-Rāzī, this form, too, can be criticized from various aspects: A body can also be divided by a forceful factor while retaining its continuity in its natural state. Here, it is normal that a single body should accept continuity and divisibility under two different circumstances, and therefore it does not need matter and form. If matter requires a bodily form, and bodily form requires continuity, then matter requires continuity since "that which requires that which is required is the one that requires". From another point of view, since division has to do with space and direction, why is it that matter, which occupies no space, accepts divisibility? Lastly, it is possible for continuity and divisibility to inhere in the body as accidents; there is no need to posit two separate substances for the establishment of these accidents.
Al-Rāzī holds that the main form of this proof, stated above, is also problematic, pointing this out in many of his various works. According to this, the proof (a) is insufficient because it does not reject the atomism of Democritos since it considers estimative division as actual division; 98 the conclusion (b) is too general to be deduced from the proofs because the idea that the body is actually divisible is extended to all bodies, although no corruption occurs in the celestial spheres ; 99 (C) is self-contradictory because at the beginning it is said that the body is divisible while at the end it is said that it is matter which is divisible. Thus, al-Rāzī finalizes the volume entitled Fī al-Hayūlā in al-Matālib, one of the last works he penned on this issue, by stating that there is no definitive evidence substantiating that the object is a compound composed of matter and form.
‫وجب‬ ‫لنفيها‬ ‫املوجبة‬ ‫القاطعة‬ ‫الدالئل‬ ‫قامت‬ ‫ملا‬ ‫أنه‬ ‫ثبت‬ ‫وقد‬ ‫الظنية،‬ ‫والقضايا‬ ‫الومهية‬ ‫األمور‬ ‫من‬ ‫ذلك‬ ‫فكل‬ ‫واخليال.‬ ‫الظن‬ ‫حكم‬ ‫إىل‬ ‫يلتفت‬ ‫ال‬ ‫أن‬
Ultimately, all these are nothing but estimative things and speculative propositions. It has become certain that judgment of conjecture and imagination must not be followed when definitive proofs that require the negation of matter are found.
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Conclusion
Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī's treatise entitled al-Hayūlā wa al- §ūrah is the first work in the history of Islamic philosophy and theology that deals exclusively with the critique of the understanding that the body is composed of matter and form. This treatise discusses systematically, all of the criticisms and proofs with respect to the composite body that appear in other works composed by al-Rāzī. The criticisms directed at the composite body by authors such as al-Shahristānī, Abu al-Barakāt 98 al- Rāzī, [91] [92] II, [53] [54] VI, 214. al-Baghdādī, and al-Mas'ūdī are not only scrutinized by al-Rāzī in this treatise, but are also restated in a systematic way. Moreover, as required by the method of verification (tahqīq), al-Rāzī reorganizes Ibn Sīnā's proofs on matter and form in this treatise, both consolidating the weak points in those proofs and highlighting the criticisms directed at them.
Throughout his scholarly career, al-Rāzī criticized the understanding that the body is composed of matter and form. There are several reasons for this attitude. According to al-Rāzī, this theory requires the existence of other pre-eternal things apart from God, imposes a limit on His will and might, undermines the notion of creation ex nihilo, and renders it difficult to prove bodily resurrection in the hereafter. Two main points on which al-Rāzī focuses his attention in the Avicennian conception of the body in the context of criticisms are the definition of the body and the issue of determining according to which principle and how separate substances unite and form a whole in the composite body. The criticisms pertaining to the definition of the body are concerned with the problems that arise from substance's being the genus of the body. The criticisms directed at the notion of substance being a high genus and the definition of the body enabled al-Rāzī to strongly emphasize the difference between the theological and philosophical traditions. When read along with his criticisms about the essential definition, the background of al-Rāzī's suggestion that the body be defined through its concomitants and properties, rather than by its essence, is better understood.
The solution that al-Rāzī proposed regarding the Avicennian conception of the body, which links continuity and divisibility to a part of the nature of the body, is to make a distinction between the essence of the body and its attributes. The emphasis on the difference between the body's essence and reality and such attributes as occupying space, extending into spatial directions, and the ability to be pointed out rendered it unnecessary to refer to independent substances, such as matter and form, on an ontological level in order to establish the unity of the object, as in Ibn Sīnā's thought. Al-Rāzī considered the body having a single reality in itself, stating that accidents such as occupying space, extension, and volume as well as being able to be pointed at physically inhere in this reality. His ideas on the reality and structure of the body will become thoroughly clear once we have published Ithbāt juz'in lā yatajazza', the other part of the manuscript collection which includes our treatise as well.
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